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THROWING AWAY THE KEY: HAS THE ADAM WALSH ACT
LOWERED THE THRESHOLD FOR SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATOR COMMITMENTS Too FAR?
Tamara Rice Lave*
Public outrage spurred passage of the first sexually violent preda-
tor law. Citizens in the state of Washington were horrified by a rash
of high profile crimes by convicted sex offenders who had been re-
leased from prison.' After a particularly horrific attack by a mentally
impaired parolee with a history of kidnapping, rape, and murder,
thousands of letters flooded the governor's office demanding that
something be done. In February 1990, Washington responded to the
mounting pressure by passing the Community Protection Act, which
authorizes the indefinite commitment of individuals determined to
be sexual violent predators ("SVPs") after they have completed their
maximum prison term.2 In order to commit someone under Wash-
ington's law, the state must prove that the accused (1) has at least one
prior crime of sexual violence and (2) currently suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that (3) makes him likely to en-
gage in future predatory acts of sexual violence. Nineteen states and
the federal government have since followed Washington's lead.4
These laws are motivated by a worthy goal-protecting innocent
men, women, and children from menacing sex offenders. At the
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. Ph.D., Jurisprudence and Social
Policy, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., Haverford Col-
lege. This Article has benefited immeasurably from the careful reading and insightful
comments of Frank Zimring, Jonathan Lave, and Michael Froomkin. I would also like to
thank Mary Coombs, Charlton Copeland, and Bob Weisberg for their helpful suggestions.
Finally, I am grateful to the University of Pennsylvania journal of Constitutional Law for their
sharp and respectful editing.
1 Barry Siegel, Locking Up 'Sexual Predators': A Public Outcry in Washington State Targeted Re-
peat Violent Sex Criminals. A New Preventative Law Would Keep Them inJail Indefinitely, L.A.
TIMES, May 10, 1990, at Al.
2 Michael G. Petrunik, Managing Unacceptable Rish: Sex Offenders, Community Response, and
Social Policy in the United States and Canada, 46 INT'L 1. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOILocY 483, 492 (2002) (comparing the risk management model for control of sex
offenders with the clinical and justice models that preceded it, and with a restorative jus-
tice alternative based on the principle of community reintegration).
3 WASH. Riv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 2008).
4 See infra Part W.A.
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same time, however, these laws pose a significant danger-locking
away individuals for the rest of their lives who would not commit a sex
offense if released. With stakes this high, accused SVPs should re-
ceive the highest procedural protections, yet the Supreme Court has
ruled that they are not entitled to many of the due process rights
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." As a result, they do not enjoy the right to competency, the
right against self-incrimination, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or
trial by jury.
In United States v. Comstock' the Supreme Court upheld the Adam
Walsh Child Safety and Protection Act ("Adam Walsh Act")," which
reduces these protections still further. The Adam Walsh Act allows a
person to be committed indefinitely as a sexually violent predator9
even if the person has never been convicted of, or even been charged
with, a sex crime. This means that any person who is in federal cus-
tody faces lifetime commitment as a dangerous sex offender if the
government is able to persuade a judge by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the person has committed, or attempted to commit, a
sexually violent offense or child molestation even though the person
was not locked up for such an offense and a jury did not find the per-
son had committed such a crime. 0 Clear and convincing evidence is
a lesser standard than beyond a reasonable doubt, and a judge and
not a jury makes the requisite factual determination. Accordingly,
under the Adam Walsh Act, a person can be confined for life even
though the evidence would not have supported ajury verdict of guilt.
5 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-60 (1997) (upholding a Kansas civil confinement
statute that required past sexually violent behavior and a mental condition that creates a
likelihood of such conduct in the future as prerequisites for incapacitation under the sta-
tute).
6 See infra notes 116-78 and accompanying text.
7 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (holding that the Constitution
grants Congress the authority to enact § 4248 as "necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution" the powers "vested by" the "Constitution in the Government of the United
States" (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18)).
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247, 4248(a) (2006). The Adam Walsh Act was passed by both houses of
Congress and signed by the President in 2006. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16991 (2006)).
9 The Adam Walsh Act uses the term "sexually dangerous persons." Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006, § 301(a). In the interests of consistency (and since
they are defined almost identically), this Article will refer to those committed as sexually
violent predators.
10 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006) (stating that "[i]f after the hearing, the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually dangerous person, the court shall
commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General").
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Although the Court ruled that the Adam Walsh Act was constitu-
tional, it did so on narrow grounds. It held only that Congress had
not exceeded its power under the Necessary and Proper Cause": "We
do not reach or decide any claim that the statute or its application
denies equal protection of the laws, procedural or substantive due
process, or any other rights guaranteed by the Constitution." 2 This
Article considers a question that the Supreme Court specifically left
open in Comstock: Does the Adam Walsh Act violate procedural due
process?
To grapple with this question, this Article first asks whether per-
sons subject to sexually violent predator laws deserve procedural pro-
tections. Some believe that because all, or at least most, sex offenders
will reoffend, it is just a waste of time and money to accord them or-
dinary due process rights. This Article shows that contrary to wide-
spread belief, the rate of sex offender recidivism is actually quite
small. The danger of a substantial number of unnecessary lifetime
incarcerations makes it particularly important to have a sufficiently
robust due process regime in place.
Part II contrasts the due process rights of sexually violent preda-
tors with those of other individuals whose mental state is at issue: the
criminally insane and the mentally ill. The Article shows that for the
most part, accused sexually violent predators have fewer procedural
protections than these other similarly situated individuals.
Part III discusses the justifications in the three seminal Supreme
Court cases for diminishing the due process protections of accused
sexually violent predators: Kansas v. Hendricks," Kansas v. Crane,4 and
United States v. Comstock.'5
Part IV then turns to state law regarding sexually violent preda-
tors, focusing on the procedural protections guaranteed by the state
SVP laws. It then compares these state law protections with the con-
stitutional minima provided by the U.S. Supreme Court. This data,
presented for the first time, provides a road map to SVP legislation
that should prove of practical importance to judges and practitioners.
Given the public's fear of sex offenders and politicians' interest in
appearing tough on crime, one might suspect that states would have
11 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965.
12 Id.
13 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997).
14 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411-15 (2002) (vacating a Kansas Supreme Court judg-
ment that interpreted Kansas v. Hendricks so that the state was required to prove that the
dangerous individual was completely unable to control his behavior to warrant confine-
ment-a standard determined by the Court in Crane to be too high).
15 See Constock, 130 S. Ct. 1949.
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conferred only the minimum protections, but this Article shows that
most states have granted more.
Part V discusses whether the Supreme Court should allow a per-
son to be committed indefinitely as a sexually violent predator even
though he has never been convicted of, or even charged with, a sex
offense. This Article argues that in creating such a low threshold for
commitment, the Adam Walsh Act violates procedural due process.
Finally, Part VI contends that enhanced procedural protections
make sense from a public policy perspective. Thus, this Article con-
cludes by arguing that states should not follow the Adam Walsh Act
regardless of how the Court rules.
I. Do SEX OFFENDERS DESERVE PROCEDURAL PROTECTION?
The fundamental factual question that needs to be answered for a
person to be committed under an SVP statute is whether he has a
current mental disorder that causes him to have difficulty controlling
himself such that he is at risk of committing a new sexually violent of-
fense. The diminished due process standards afforded to accused
SVPs during this process appear to derive from the belief of politi-
cians and the general public that most, if not all, sex offenders will
continue to be dangerous even after they have served their prison
sentences.'6 Many believe that child molesters pose the gravest dan-
ger because, as Justice Breyer wrote, they suffer from "pedophilia-a
mental abnormality that critically involves what a lay person might
describe as a lack of control." 7
If politicians and the public are correct then procedural protec-
tions for accused sexually violent predators may seem less critical. If
everyone is going to reoffend, then the only kind of mistake we could
ever make is a false negative-releasing someone who we think is safe
but is actually still dangerous. Indeed, if a significant share, but not
all, people are likely to reoffend then there is an argument for lesser
due process because the expected societal cost of a false negative
16 Between April 19, 2005, and May 1, 2005, a poll sponsored by CNN/USA Today and Gal-
lup asked respondents: "At your best guess, do you think people who commit the crime
of child sexual molestation can be successfully rehabilitated to the point where they are
no longer a threat to children, or not?" Twenty-seven percent of those who responded
said that child molesters could be rehabilitated, whereas 65% said they could not. Tama-
ra Rice Lave, Inevitable Recidivism,-The Oigin and Centrality of an Urban Legend, 34 INT'l.
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 186, 188 (2011) (examining the conviction that sex offenders-
particularly child molesters-will continue to reoffend).
17 Crane, 534 U.S. at 414.
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outweighs the expected cost of a false positive."' Contrary to public
opinion, however, studies show that most offenders do not continue
to recidivate after being released.'9 This means that society must con-
front the very real problem of the false positive-locking someone
away who would not otherwise reoffend.o
In 2003, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") released a report
studying the recidivism of sex offenders released in 1994.2' The DOJ
study followed the entire population of sex offenders released from
18 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that courts should apply a
three-part balancing test in determining whether an individual's due process rights have
been violated under the U.S. Constitution, namely (1) the significance of the interest at
stake, (2) the risk of a false deprivation of the interest due to the procedures used as well
as an assessment of the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the
government's interest).
19 These studies have been criticized for not taking into account underreporting. SeeJody
Clay-Warner & Callie H. Burt, Rape Reporting After Reforms: Have Times Really Changed?, 11
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 150, 150-51 (2005) (stating that despite the significance of
reporting to the overall success of reforms, only limited empirical research has examined
changes in rape reporting across time); Bonnie S. Fisher, Leah E. Daigle, Francis T. Cul-
len & Michael G. Turner, Reporting Sexual Victimization to the Police and Others: Results From
a National-Level Study of College Women, 30 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 6, 7 (2003) (discussing
empirical data from various studies concluding that a large proportion of victims did not
report their sexual victimization to the police or other authorities); Mary P. Koss, Chris-
tine A. Gidycz & Nadine Wisniewski, The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual
Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162, 162 (1987) (estimating that for every rape re-
ported, three to ten rapes are committed but not reported); John J. Sloan III, Bonnie S.
Fisher & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing the Student Right to Know and Campus Security Act of
1990: An Analysis of the Victim Reporting Practices of College and University Students, 43 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 148, 149 (1997) (stating that the usefulness of measuring the incidence
and nature of campus crime may be limited because the Student Right to Know and
Campus Security Act's reporting requirements overlook theft-related crimes and depend
on victim reporting). The National Crime Victimization Survey ("NCVS")-which esti-
mates crime victimization across the United States using a nationally representative sam-
ple of households-finds significantly higher reporting rates. MICHAEL RAND & SHANNAN
CATAIANO, BUREAU OFJUSTIC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. NCJ 219413,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2006, at 5 (2007). The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated
that 41.4% of all forcible rapes and sexual assaults were reported to the police in 2006.
Id. Reporting rates were similar for the three-year period studied in the 2003 Department
of Justice report. For a detailed discussion of underreporting in sex crimes, see Tamara
Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued Incarceration at What Cost? 14
NEw CRIM. L. REv. 213 (2011).
20 See Lave, supra note 19, at 266 (stating that despite the fact that the general public be-
lieves that sex offenders are incapable of controlling themselves, recidivism rates in the
United States, according to studies by the Department ofJustice, are actually low).
21 PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEw R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PUB. No. NCJ 198281, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS
REIEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 (2003) [hereinafter DOJ].
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prison in fifteen states-9691 sex offenders.22  Of these offenders,
3115 had been convicted of rape; 6576 were convicted of sexual as-
sault; 4295 were convicted of child molestation; and 443 were con-
victed of statutory rape for a total of 9691 out of 272,111 prisoners re-
leased in 1994.3 Within three years after release from prison, 5.3%
or 517 of the convicted sex offenders were rearrested for a new sex
crime.2 During that same three-year period, 5.0% of convicted rap-
ists were rearrested for a new sex crime. Finally, 3.3% or 141 of the
convicted child molesters were arrested for another sex crime against
a child.6
It is important to note that researchers continued to track re-
leased offenders during the entire three-year period. If, for in-
stance, a person were rearrested for burglary and then later for rape
both of these arrests would have been recorded. Thus within the en-
tire three-year period, just 5.3% of sex offenders were rearrested for a
new sex crime.28
It is true, however, that convicted sex offenders were significantly
more likely to be arrested for a new sex crime than released offenders
who had not been convicted of a sex crime. Compared to 5.3% of
convicted sex offenders, only 1.3% of persons convicted for non-sex
related offenses were subsequently arrested for a sex crime within
three years after release V Less than half of 1% of those previously
convicted of a non-sex offense were rearrested for a new sex crime
against a child.o
Not only do few sex offenders get rearrested for committing a new
sex crime, but sex offenders are less likely then non-sex offenders to
22 These states were Arizona, Maryland, North Carolina, California, Michigan, Ohio, Dela-




25 Id. at 24.
26 Id. at 1.
27 All available studies show that recidivism rates drop each year after an offender's release:
For all crimes (and almost all behaviours) the likelihood that the behavior will
reappear decreases the longer the person has abstained from that behaviour. The
recidivism rate within the first two years after release from prison is much higher
than the recidivism rate between years 10 and 12 after release from prison.
ANDREWJ.R. HARRIS & R. KARL HANSON, SEX OFFENDER RECIDIVISM: A SIMPLE QUESTION,
PUBLIC SAFETY & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA 1 (2004). Harris and Hanson found
that the rate of recidivism in the populations they studied decreased by half every five
years. Id. at 9.
28 Id. at 11.
29 DQJ, supra note 21, at 24.
30 Id. at 30.
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be rearrested for any crime at all. Forty-three percent of sex offend-
ers released in 1994 were arrested for a new crime within three
years.)' In contrast, 68% of non-sex offenders released in 1994 were
32
arrested for any new crime within three years.
Other studies have come to similar conclusions. In 1998, Hanson
and Bussiere did a meta-analysis of sixty-one studies from six different
countries, including the United States.3 3 They found that over an av-
erage follow-up time of four to five years, the sex offense recidivism
rate was 13.4%. In 2007, Sample and Bray used arrest data from
1990-1997 collected by the Illinois State Police.35  They found that
less than 4% of convicted child molesters were rearrested for any sex
offense within one, three, and five years after release from custody."
They also found that about 7% of convicted rapists were rearrested
for any sex offense within five years after release.
Not only do most sex offenders not recidivate, but, like other
types of offenders, their risk of doing so decreases as they age. In
2002, R. Karl Hanson used data from ten follow up studies of adult
male sex offenders ages 18-70+ (combined sample of 4673) to study
the relationship between age and sexual recidivism. He found that
"[i]n the total sample, the recidivism rate declined steadily with
age .... [and] [t] he association was linear." 8 Other researchers have
reported similar results,) even when analyzing the age effect on a
31 Id. at 2.
32 Id.
33 R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offend-
er Recidivism Studies, 66J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 350 (1998).
34 Id. at 357.
35 Lisa L. Sample & Timothy M. Bray, Are Sex Offenders Different? An Examination of Rearrest
Patterns, 17 CRIM.JUST. POL'Y REV. 83, 88 (2006).
36 Id. at 95.
37 Id.
38 R. Karl Hanson, Recidivism and Age: Follow-Up Data from 4,673 Sexual Offenders, 17 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1046, 1053 (2002). Interestingly, Hanson found that there
were differences among offender groups. Id. at 1054. The recidivism rate of both incest
offenders and rapists declined steadily over time, and neither type of offender released
after age sixty recidivated. Id. Although the recidivism rate of extra-familial child mole-
sters also declined steadily with age, the drop was much less until the offender reached
age forty-nine, when recidivism dropped dramatically. Id. Two extrafamilial child mole-
sters released after the age of sixty recidivated. Id.
39 Howard E. Barbaree et al., Aging Versus Stable Enduring Traits as Explanatory Constructs in
Sex Offender Recidivism: Partitioning Actuarial Prediction into Conceptually Meaningful Compo-
nents, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 443, 443 (2009) ("A large body of evidence has recently ac-
cumulated indicating that recidivism in sex offenders decreases with the age of the of-
fender at the time of his release from custody." (citations omitted)); Patrick Lussier et al.,
Criminal Trajectories of Adult Sex Offenders and the Age Effect: Examining the Dynamic Aspect of
Offending in Adulthood, 20 INT'L CRIM. JUST. REV. 147, 164 (2010) (showing that "there
397Dec. 20111
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTTIONAL LAW
sample of offenders with a higher recidivism rate than the general
.40prison population.
The significance of the protective value of age in recidivating can-
not be underestimated in the sexually violent predator context.
Since accused SVPs must have completed their custodial sentence be-
fore the state can begin commitment proceedings, they are likely to
be older and thus at lower risk of reoffending. As a result, states and
the federal government may be initiating civil commitment proceed-
ings against individuals who have simply aged out of being danger-
ous.
The facts are crystal clear. The DOJ study and other studies show
that sex offenders have a low rate of recidivism and that they are less
likely than non-sex offenders to commit additional non-sex related
crimes. In addition, because accused sexually violent predators are
older, their risk of reoffending has diminished. Accordingly, it is
crucial to provide extensive procedural protections so as to prevent
people from being locked up indefinitely-most of whom in fact pose
no further threat to society. As the next Part shows, however, accused
sexually violent predators enjoy reduced procedural rights.
might be several explanations as to why older sex offenders represent a lower risk of reci-
divism"); Patrick Lussier & Jay Healey, Rediscovering Quetelet, Again: The "Aging" Offender
and the Prediction of Reo]fnding in a Sample of Adult Sex Offenders, 26 JUST. Q 827, 851
(2009) (finding that the risk of recidivism does decrease with age); Richard Wollert et al.,
Recent Research (N = 9,305) Underscores the Importance of Using Age-Stratified Actuarial Tables in
Sex Offender Risk Assessments, 22 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. OF RES. & TREATMENT 471, 484 (2010)
(concluding that "evaluators should report recidivism estimates from age stratified tables
or equivalent tables when they are assessing sexual recidivism risk, particularly when eva-
luating the aging sex offender").
40 In 2007, Prentky and Lee looked at the age effect on a cohort of 136 rapists and 115 child
molesters who had been civilly committed to a Massachusetts prison and were then fol-
lowed for twenty-five years. Robert Alan Prentky & Austin F. S. Lee, Effect of Age-at-Release
on Long Term Sexual Re-offense Rates in Civilly Committed Sexual Offenders, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE:
J. OF RES. & TREATMENT, 43, 53 (2007). They found that with rapists, recidivism dropped
linearly as a function of age. Id. With child molesters, however, they found that recidiv-
ism increased from age twenty to age forty and then declined slightly at age fifty and sig-
nificantly at age sixty. Id. As Prentky and Lee point out, their sample is statistically small
and it is comprised of offenders with a higher base rate of recidivism than drawn from the
general prison population. They conclude:
Although this latter consideration must be regarded as a limitation in terms of ge-
neralizability, it may also be seen as a strength of the study. Presumably, using a
higher risk sample is a more severe test of the age-crime hypothesis, providing
confirmatory support for the rapists and "amplifying" or exaggerating the quadrat-
ic blip in Hanson's (2002) data for child molesters.
Id. at 58.
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II. COMPARING THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF ACCUSED SVPS TO
SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS
The sexually violent predator laws have four distinctive features.
First, they are classified as civil,4' which has broad implications for the
rights that those facing commitment as SVP's enjoy. Second, com-
mitment is almost always indeterminate; thus, a person remains a
sexually violent predator unless and until he is deemed to no longer
pose a threat.4 2 Third, SVP commitment occurs at the back end of a
penal commitment. In other words, the state does not begin the
process of designating someone a sexually violent predator until he is
about to be released from custody. Fourth and finally, commitment
is a supplement, not an alternative, to a prison sentence.4 This Part
compares the procedural rights of sexually violent predators with
other individuals whose mental state is at issue: the criminally insane
and the mentally ill. Despite the fact that accused sexually violent
predators face greater, or at least equal, deprivations of liberty, they
are afforded fewer procedural protections.
1. Comparing Sexually Violent Predator Laws with Commitment of the
Criminally Insane
The factual question at a criminal insanity hearing is whether the
defendant was legally insane at the time that he committed his crimes
as compared with sexually violent predator hearings in which the
question is whether the individual has a currently diagnosed mental
disorder that causes him to be dangerous. Because a criminal insani-
ty hearing takes place within the context of the criminal adjudicatory
process, these defendants have more procedural protections than
SVPs.
One notable difference between an insanity hearing and an SVP
hearing is the right to competency. All criminal defendants have the
right to be competent,5 and since a criminal defendant must enter a
41 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997) (stating that involuntary confine-
ment pursuant to Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act is not punitive).
42 Id. at 363-64 ("If, at any time, the confined person is adjudged 'safe to be at large,' he is
statutorily entitled to immediate release." (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994))).
43 Id. at 352-53.
44 Id. at 352-54 (stating that an individual determined to be a sexually violent predator
would be "transferred to the custody of the Secretary of Social and Rehabiliation Servic-
es ... for 'control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality
or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large'").
45 See Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 961 (1956) (per curiam) (vacating judgment
and remanding the case to the district court for a hearing on the sanity of petitioner at
Dec. 2011] 399
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plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, he must be deemed compe-
tent in order to enter that plea." In contrast, since sexually violent
predator commitments are civil, there is no constitutional right to
47
competency.
Competency means that a defendant must understand the charges
against him and be able to assist in his own defense. If it appears at
any time after the commencement of prosecution and prior to
sentencing that a defendant does not meet this threshold, then the
court must suspend criminal proceedings and conduct a hearing
either in front of a jury or on its own. At that hearing, the state is
permitted to presume competency and require the defendant to
prove otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.48 Should a
judge or jury find that a defendant is not competent to stand trial, he
may not be held more than the "reasonable period of time necessary
to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will
attain that capacity in the foreseeable future."49  If it is determined
that competency is not foreseeable, the state must either begin the
standard civil commitment procedures or release him.o
The criminally insane also have the right to have jurors determine
whether they were insane at the time they committed their offense,
as well as the right against self-incrimination at that trial. States may
the time of his trial); see also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966) (holding that
"Robinson's constitutional rights were abridged by his failure to receive an adequate
hearing on his competence to stand trial").
46 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992) (" [T]he entry of a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity ... presupposes that the defendant is competent to stand trial and to
enter a plea.").
47 See Moore v. Super. Ct., 237 P.3d 530, 547 (Cal. 2010) (holding that "due process does
not require mental competence on the part of someone undergoing a commitment or
recommitment trial under the SVPA").
48 See Medina, 505 U.S. at 452-53 (stating that there is a presumption of competence on the
defendant, that the defendant bears the burden of rebutting it, and that the presumption
does not violate the Due Process Clause). But see Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369
(1996) (holding that it was unconstitutional to require the defendant to prove compe-
tency by clear and convincing evidence).
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
50 See id. (holding that the state must either institute customary civil commitment proceed-
ings or release the defendant if it cannot be determined that there is a substantial proba-
bility that he will attain capacity in the foreseeable future).
51 In iff v. Wainight, the Supreme Court ruled that executing the insane violates the
Eighth Amendment. 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). Although condemned inmates have the
right to a full and fair hearing on whether they are insane, the Court has never held that
they have the right to ajury finding on that fact. Id. at 424-25 (Powell,J., concurring); see
also Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 409 (1897) (holding that a suggestion made after
verdict and sentence that the defendant might be insane does not give rise to an absolute
right to have the insanity issue tried before ajury).
400 [Vol. 14:2
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afford SVPs these rights, but they are not required to do so under the
Constitution.2
Although the criminally insane enjoy more procedural protec-
tions than SVPs, one notable exception regards the burden of proof.
As discussed above, SVP hearings almost always occur after a person
has been convicted of a crime and after he has completed his penal
sentence. The burden of proof is on the prosecutor, and she must
show by at least clear and convincing evidence that the individual has
a current mental disorder that causes him to have difficulty control-
ling himself such that he poses the risk of future dangerousness.
In contrast, insanity is usually an affirmative defense at trial. Al-
though the Supreme Court has never held that defendants have the
right to the insanity defense,5 3 most states allow it.54 The Supreme
Court has ruled that it does not violate due process for the defendant
to have to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt." Most states
set the burden of proof at a preponderance of the evidence, and only
Arizona requires that the defendant prove that he was insane by clear
and convincing evidence .
Commitment for both is indefinite. If a person is found not guilty
by reason of insanity, he can be committed to a locked mental hos-
pital until he can show that he is either no longer mentally ill or dan-
gerous.5 7 The Supreme Court has held that he may be committed for
a period that exceeds the maximum sentence associated with the un-
581derlying charges. Similarly, a person adjudicated to be an SVP can
be held until he is determined to no longer have a currently diag-
nosed mental disorder that causes him to be dangerous.
52 See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (holding that commitment proceedings un-
der Illinois's Sexually Dangerous Persons Act were civil and not criminal and thus the
right against self incrimination did not apply).
53 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 n.20 (2006).
54 See Elizabeth Aileen Smith, Did They Forget to Zero the Scales?: To Ertse jury Deliberations, the
Supreme Court Cuts Protection for the Mentally Ill in Clark v. Arizona, 26 L. & INEQUALITYJ.
203, 209 (2008) (stating that four states have eliminated the insanity defense altogether).
55 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952).
56 Four states do not allow the insanity defense. Smith, supra note 54, at 209.
57 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983) ("Congress has determined that a
criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in the District of Columbia
should be committed indefinitely to a mental institution for treatment and the protection
of society.").
58 Id. at 369-70.
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2. Comparing Sexually Violent Predator Laws with Commitment of the
Mentally Ill
The sexually violent predator laws were specifically enacted to allow
the state to commit repeat sex offenders who did not fall under the
existing civil commitment laws because they were not mentally ill.3
When Washington crafted the first SVP law, it created a new standard
of mental defect-that of a "mental abnormality or personality dis-
order which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence . . . ."o Other states would soon follow Washington's
lead, including Kansas, whose sexually violent predator statute was
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks.m
Both the National Mental Health Association and the Washington
State Psychiatric Association were deeply concerned by this newly de-
fined quasi-mental illness, and they wrote amicus briefs in Hendricks
urging the Court to overturn the Kansas statute on the grounds that
it would confine individuals who were not mentally ill. The Washing-
ton State Psychiatric Association pointed out the dangers of using
such an ambiguous term: "Because 'mental abnormality' has no rec-
ognized clinical meaning, there is no way to assure it will be applied
so that only persons who are mentally ill are subject to civil commit-
ment."" As noted below, however, the Supreme Court held that
committing someone with a "mental abnormality" does not violate
the person's due process rights. 3
Although the sexually violent predator laws have a more expansive
definition of mental illness than the laws governing civil commitment
of the mentally ill, they offer similar procedural protections. Both
have the right to written notice and an adversary hearing before an
independent decisionmaker.64 At that hearing, they have the right to
"qualified and independent assistance. "" In addition, both require
that the state prove by a minimum standard of clear and convincing
evidence that the person being committed is both mentally ill and
dangerous.66 In meeting this burden, the state must show that the
59 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997) ("[T]he legislature determined that
existing civil commitment procedures were inadequate to confront the risks presented by
'sexually violent predators.'").
60 WASH. REv. CODE § 71.09.020 (18) (2008).
61 Id. at 371.
62 Brief for Washington State Pyschiatric Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent, Hendidcks, 521 U.S. 346 (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 468611 at *14.
63 Hendridh, 521 U.S. at 360.
64 Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
65 Id. at 500.
66 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
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person's mental illness causes the person to be dangerous.7 In Kan-
sas v. Crane," the Supreme Court held that in order to commit some-
one as a sexually violent predator, the state must show that the per-
son's "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" makes it "diffi-
"difficult, if not impossible for the [dangerous] person to control his
dangerous behavior."69 With regards to civil commitments of the
mentally ill, the states have differed as to what must be shown in or-
der to prove dangerousness. Some states, like Virginia, Georgia,
Montana, Hawaii, and Ohio require that the state prove that the indi-
vidual poses an "imminent danger" to himself or others. Most
states, however, use a lesser standard, that of: "substantial likelihood"
or "significant risk."71
Once the state has proved that a person is mentally ill and dan-
gerous or a sexually violent predator, he can be committed indefi-
nitely. Once that person is determined to no longer be mentally ill
or dangerous or to have a diagnosed mental disorder, he must be re-
leased.
III. CHALLENGES TO THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS
The previous Part showed that a person in an SVP proceeding en-
joys less procedural protection than persons facing commitment for
being criminally insane or mentally ill. This Part explores the Su-
preme Court's justifications for affording less protection in the con-
text of sexually violent predator commitments.
A. Kansas v. Hendricks
The first challenge to the sexually violent predator laws reached
the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendicks.13 Leroy Hendricks was an
admitted pedophile whose record of child molestation convictions
67 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 73 (1992).
68 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
69 Id. at 410 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)).
70 Alison Pfeffer, Note, "Imminent Danger" and Inconsiiency: The Need for National ?eforn of the
"Imminent Danger" Standard for Involuntary Civil Commitment in the Wake of the Virginia Tech
Tragedy, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 277, 279 (2008).
71 Id.
72 See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 83 (holding that the state cannot continue to civilly commit some-
one who may be dangerous but is not mentally ill); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
576 (1975) (holding that the state cannot continue to civilly commit someone who is
mentally ill but not dangerous).
73 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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stretched out over twenty-nine years. In 1994, a Kansas jury found
that Leroy Hendricks was a sexually violent predator-meaning that
he had a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" that made it
likely that he would engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence. As
a result of this finding, Hendricks was committed indefinitely to a
locked facility.
Hendricks appealed the finding to the Kansas Supreme Court, ar-
guing that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act violated the U.S.
Constitution's "substantive" Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex
Post Facto Clauses." The Kansas Supreme Court addressed only
Hendricks' due process claim and overturned the conviction on the
ground that "mental abnormality" as defined by the Act did not meet
the standards for mental illness as set out by the U.S. Supreme Court
in cases governing civil commitment.8 The state of Kansas appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which narrowly overturned the Kansas
Supreme Court. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion.
The majority began its analysis by noting that in narrow circums-
tances "an individual's constitutionally protected liberty interest in
avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil con-
text."09 Specifically, society may restrain dangerous individuals who
cannot control themselves in the name of public safety." A finding of
future dangerousness, alone, would be insufficient to justify involun-
tary commitment. Civil commitment statutes have been sustained,
"when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of
some additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnor-
mality.'"' In addition, the statutes must also meet "proper proce-
dur(al) and evidentiary standards." 2
The Court held that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act did
meet these standards. In his majority opinion, Justice Thomas em-
phasized the fact that in order to be committed, a person must have
either (1) been charged with a sexually violent offense but found in-
competent to stand trial, or (2) been convicted of a sexually violent
offense, or (3) been found not guilty by reason of insanity, or due to
a mental disease or defect, of a sexually violent offense. The statute
74 Id. at 353-56.
75 Id. at 352, 356.
76 Id. at 350.
77 Id. at 356.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 357.
81 Id. at 358.
82 Id. at 357.
404 [Vol. 14:2
THROWING AWAY THE KEY
requires proof of more than a mere predisposition to violence; rather
"[i]t requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a present
mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the fu-
ture if the person is not incapacitated."83
The Court further held that the Act passed constitutional muster
even though it used the term "mental abnormality" instead of mental
illness. In so doing, the Court ignored the amicus briefs written by
the National Mental Health Association and the Washington State
Psychiatric Association in which they urged the Court to overturn the
Kansas statute on the grounds that it would confine individuals who
were not mentally ill. The National Mental Health Association wrote,
"The term 'mental illness' is reserved for psychological conditions
that impair virtually every aspect of the lives of people it affects. It
does not apply to those who merely cannot resist deviant sexual urges
whose origin, in any case, is unrelated to mental illness."84
The Washington State Psychiatric Association made a similar ar-
gument. It first pointed out that "being a sex offender does not, in
itself, imply a mental disorder or mental illness.",1 It then critiqued
the statute's requirement that an individual have a "mental abnor-
mality" on the grounds that the term is not clinically meaningful and
is in disuse.
In contrast, the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers
submitted an amicus brief arguing that the term "mental abnormali-
ty" did have a specific meaning to mental health professionals."
Neither the National Mental Health Association nor the Washing-
ton State Psychiatric Association persuaded Justice Thomas. He
wrote, "Contrary to Hendricks' assertion, the term 'mental illness' is
devoid of any talismanic significance. Not only do 'psychiatrists dis-
agree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness,' but
the Court itself has used a variety of expressions to describe the men-
tal condition of those properly subject to civil confinement."" Since
the Court has "traditionally left to legislators the task of defining
terms of a medical nature that have legal significance,"" it was ac-
ceptable for the Kansas legislature to use the standard of "mental ab-
83 Id.
84 Brief for the National Mental Health Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent, Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 471077 at *7.
85 Brief for Washington State Pyschiatric Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent, Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 468611 at *7-8.
86 Brief for Association of the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as Amicus Curiae Washington
Supporting Petitioner, Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (No. 95-1649), 1996 WL 471027 at *3.
87 Hendridck, 521 U.S. at 359 (citations omitted).
88 Id.
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normality." The Court then considered Hendricks' claim that the Act
violated the Constitution's ban on double jeopardy and ex post facto
laws by creating a new law that punished him for past conduct for
which he had already been convicted and served time." The analysis
hinged on whether the Act was civil or criminal. The Court noted-
and took deference to-the stated intent of the Kansas legislature
that the Act was civil. It then discussed the two goals of punishment:
retribution and deterrence. With regards to retribution, the Court
held that the Act was not retributive because the prior criminal con-
duct was admitted not to "affix culpability" but instead to show that a
"mental abnormality" existed in order to prove that the individual
still posed a risk.90 The Court found that the Act was not aimed at de-
terrence because individuals were unlikely to be deterred (due to the
very nature of their mental disorder) .
Holding that the SVP law was civil and not criminal has had a pro-
found effect on the procedural protections afforded to accused sex-
ually violent predators. Even though most SVPs face indefinite com-
mitment to a locked facility, they do not have the same rights as
someone charged with committing a misdemeanor. Part IV will dis-
cuss these reduced protections in more detail.
B. Kansas v. Crane
In Kansas v. Crane the Court clarified what it had meant in Hen-
dricks when it said that the "mental abnormality" or "personality dis-
order" must make it "difficult if not impossible for the person to con-
trol his behavior."2 Michael Crane, also a convicted sex offender,
appealed his commitment as a sexually violent predator. The Kansas
Supreme Court overturned the commitment on the grounds that the
federal Constitution, as interpreted in Hendricks, required that the de-
fendant be unable to control his dangerous behavior, but no such
finding had been made at trial. The state of Kansas appealed, ar-
guing that the Kansas Supreme Court had interpreted the holding in
Hendricks too restrictively.94 In a 7-2 decision, the Court agreed and
vacated the Kansas Supreme Court's judgment.
89 Id. at 361.
90 Id. at 362.
91 Id. at 362-63.
92 Id. at 358 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-20a02(b) (1994)).
93 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002).
94 Id. at 409.
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Despite the fact that the Hendricks opinion had specifically de-
scribed the Kansas law as being akin to laws that provided for the
"forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their
behavior,"9 the Court now held that the state did not need to prove
an inability to control. Yet the Court did not adopt Kansas's position
that a person could be committed as a sexually violent predator
"without any lack of control determination. "" Instead, the Court
held that the standard was "proof of serious difficulty in controlling
behavior."" The Court noted that a large population of the prison
population is mentally ill. To ensure that the confinement remains
civil and not criminal, the Court stated that the sexually violent pre-
dator must be distinguishable from other sex offenders: "The severity
of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality,
or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but
typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary case.""
C. United States v. Comstock
In United States v. Comstock,"' the Supreme Court upheld the Adam
Walsh Act, which eroded these procedural protections even further.
In 2006, the government instituted proceedings in district court to
commit Comstock and four other respondents as sexually dangerous
persons under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. The
respondents moved to dismiss on constitutional grounds. They ar-
gued that the Act was criminal and not civil and thus violated double
jeopardy, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments. They argued further that the Act denied them subs-
tantive due process and equal protection under the law. They also
claimed that setting the burden of proof at clear and convincing evi-
dence violated their procedural due process rights. Finally, they ar-
gued that in passing the statute, Congress had exceeded its power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article 1, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss on grounds that
the Constitution required the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
95 Hendicks, 521 U.S. at 357.
96 Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (emphasis in original).
97 Id. at 413.
98 Id.
99 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010).
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doubt and that the Act exceeded congressional power.'00 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal on
grounds that the law exceeded Congress's powers under Article 1,
Section 8 of the Constitution.'o' The Fourth Circuit did not decide
the standard of proof question; nor did it consider any of the other
constitutional arguments raised below.
By a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit
and held that the Adam Walsh Act did not exceed Congressional
power. 0 2 In its decision, the majority did not address the most troub-
ling part of the law-that people can be indefinitely committed to a
locked facility as sexually dangerous persons even though they were
never convicted of, or even charged with, a sex crime. This signifi-
cant deprivation of procedural rights did not even warrant a footnote
in the majority opinion.
The Adam Walsh Act significantly expands who may be civilly
committed under federal law and goes well beyond the law in almost
every state. Currently, every SVP state except New York and North
Dakota follows Kansas and requires that a person have been first con-
victed or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent
offense. Some states allow commitment proceedings against some-
one who was deemed incompetent to stand trial but only after the
judge first conducts a hearing in which the prosecutor must prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In stark contrast, the
Adam Walsh Act only requires that the government prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the accused sexually violent predator
committed a sexually violent offense or child molestation."
This diminished procedural protection did not escape the notice
of all judges. In ruling the law unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit
specifically noted how much "more narrowly drawn" the state statutes
were than the federal one.'o0 Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Thomas
was extremely critical of this aspect of the statute:
[T]he statute's definition of a "sexually dangerous person" contains no
element relating to the subject's crime. It thus does not require a federal
court to find any connection between the reasons supporting civil com-
mitment and the enumerated power with which that persons' criminal
conduct interfered. As a consequence, § 4248 allows a court to civilly
commit an individual without finding that he was ever charged with or
100 United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 275 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1949
(2010).
101 Id. at 284.
102 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956, 1965.
103 18 U.S.C. § 4248d (2006).
104 Comstock, 551 F.3d at 277 n.2.
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convicted of a federal crime involving sexual violence. That possibility is
not merely hypothetical: The Government concedes that nearly 20% of
individuals against whom § 4248 proceedings have been brought fit this
description.
IV. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAWS ACROSS THE COUNTRY
As described above, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the right
of states to lock up people indefinitely with minimal procedural pro-
tections. In discussing how the Supreme Court should respond to a
future procedural due process challenge of the Adam Walsh Act, it is
helpful to first gain an understanding of sexually violent predator leg-
islation across the country. This Part will begin by discussing the de-
fining features of sexually violent predator laws. It will then offer a
state-by-state look at the number, type, and cost of SVP commitments.
Subsequently, it will describe the procedural protections afforded by
each state.
A. The Proliferation of Sexually Violent Predator Laws Across the United
States
Currently, twenty states and the federal government have enacted
laws calling for the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent
predators.'o0 These states include: Arizona, California, Florida, Illi-
nois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.' By
the summer of 2008, states had committed more than 3718 individu-
als as sexually violent predators.'0o
1. Date of SVP Passage, Length/Type of Commitment and Number of
People Committed
There is little variation in terms of the length and type of com-
mitment mandated under the nation's sexually violent predator laws.
105 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1977 (citations omitted).
106 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006); Michael Cooper, Senate Passes Bill to Detain Sex Offenders After Pri-
on, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at B3 (recounting New York's passage of a law calling for in-
voluntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators); Monica Davey & Abby Good-
nough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 4, 2007, at Al
(listing all twenty states that have enacted such laws except New York).
107 Davey & Goodnough, supra note 106 (listing all of the above states except New York be-
cause it had not yet passed its sexually violent predator law).
108 See Table 2.
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In almost all states, and in the federal system, commitment as a sex-
ually violent predator means an indeterminate commitment to a
locked mental hospital.o9
There are some exceptions. North Dakota specifically states that a
sexually violent predator should be placed in the least restrictive
available treatment facility or program necessary to achieve the goals
of the statute."0 Virginia also provides for less restrictive alternatives
to involuntary, secure, inpatient treatment."' Also of note, New
Hampshire orders that sexually violent predators be committed to a
secure psychiatric unit, but the order of commitment is only valid for
five years."' Texas is unique in that it only provides for outpatient
treatment; however it requires that the person reside in a Texas resi-
dential facility."' If the person subsequently violates any terms of his
release, he may be prosecuted and sent into custody." 4
In 2008, I wrote to each of the states that had passed sexually vio-
lent predator legislation and asked for data regarding commitments
in their state. Specifically, I requested information on the number of
commitments, the number in the process of being committed, the
number released, the types of offenses those committed had been
convicted of, and a breakdown of SVPs by race, gender, and age. I
received data from all of the states except Florida and Nebraska. I
received incomplete data from Massachusetts. For these three states I
used data that was published in a 2007 New York Times article. 15 Since
that data was collected in 2006, and since the laws are still in effect, I
am assuming that these states had more committed SVP's in 2008
than they did in 2006.
Table 2 shows that few people committed as SVPs have ever been
released. For instance, by 2008, California had committed 808
people as sexually violent predators; yet over that same thirteen-year
period, just twenty-four people were released. The fact that just 3%
109 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(B)(1) (2009); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 6604 (West 2009); FIA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917(2) (West 2006); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/40(a) (West 2008); IowA CODE ANN. § 229A.7(5) (West 2006);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 123A, § 14(d) (LexisNexis
2003); MINN. STAT. § 253B.185(1) (2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.495 (West 2006); NEr.
REV. STAT. § 71-1209(4) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.32(a) (West 2009); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAw § 10.07(f) (McKinney 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (2008);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 2008); Wis. STAT. § 980.06 (2008).
110 N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2008).
Ill VA. CODE. ANN. § 37.2-908(E) (2009).
112 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E: 11 (LexisNexis 2008).
113 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081(a) (West 2009).
114 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.085 (West 2009).
115 Davey & Goodnough, supra note 106, at Al.
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of SVPs have been released is important because it shows that the de-
privation of liberty under the sexually violent predator laws is signifi-
cant. Recent history suggests that once a person is committed as an
SVP, it is unlikely that he will ever be released.
2. SVP Laws Across the Country: Procedural Protections
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court held that sexually violent preda-
tor commitments are civil and not criminal."6 This ruling meant that
accused sexually violent predators are not entitled to the same pa-
117
noply of procedural protections that criminal defendants possess.
Yet as this Part will show, most states provide accused sexually violent
predators with more rights than the constitutional minimum.
Although the government is not constitutionally required to pro-
vide counsel to indigent SVPs,"s all states and the federal government
do so."9 Guaranteeing SVPs counsel is important because "[t]he
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." 20
One of the most significant differences between states regarding
the protections provided to accused SVPs is the right to a jury trial.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "(i)n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an impartial
jury."' 2 ' The Supreme Court has held that the right to jury trial at-
taches when a criminal defendant is facing more than six months in
116 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
117 Although the Court in Hendricks did not lay out which procedural protections are due to
accused individuals in SVP cases, it is possible to figure them out by looking at other Su-
preme Court cases. Table 2 of this Article includes an entry for Hendricks along with the
implied protections.
118 Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980).
119 18 U.S.C. 4247(d) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §36-3704(C) (2008); CAL. WE'IF. & INST.
CODE § 6603(a) (West 2011); FIA. STAT. § 394.916(3) (2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
207/25(c)(1) (2008); IOWA CODE § 229A.6(1) (2011); KAN. STAt. ANN. § 59-29a06(b)
(2006); MAsS. GEN. LAwss ch. 123A, § 13(c) (2011); MINN. STAT. § 253B.07(2)(c)(2010);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 632.492 (2011); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71.945 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
135-E:11(III) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.31(a) (2008); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAwS
§ 10.06(c) (McKinney 2011); N.D. C1:NT. CODE § 25-03.3-09(3) (2011); 42 PA. CONs. STAT.
§ 9795.4(e)(2) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-90(B) (2010); Tix. HiEALT1H & SAFETY
CoDE ANN. § 841.005 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-901 (2011); WAsII. REV. CODE
§ 71.09.050(1) (2011); Wis. STAT. § 980.03(2) (a) (2011); see abo People v. Fraser, 138 Cal.
App. 4th 1430 (2006) (holding that person did not have the right to self-representation
in a recommitment proceeding under the Sixth Amendment).
120 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
121 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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jail. 22  Because SVP commitments are classified as civil, the Sixth
Amendment right does not apply, which means that individuals fac-
ing indefinite lifetime commitment have less protection than those
facing 181 days in jail. Most states do give accused sexually violent
persons the right to ajury trial,'2 3 but as Table 4 below shows, they dif-
fer on how many jurors are required to render a verdict. 24 Only five
states and the federal government12  do not guarantee this right:
Minnesota,1" Nebraska, 2 New Jersey, North Dakota, 2 and Pennsyl-
vania.10
122 See United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (per curiam) ("[I]n order to deter-
mine whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial attaches to a particular offense,
the court must examine objective indications of the seriousness with which society re-
gards the offense. The best indicator of society's views is the maximum penalty set by the
legislature. While the word 'penalty' refers both to the term of imprisonment and other
statutory penalties,... primary emphasis . .. must be placed on the maximum authorized
period of incarceration. . . . [O]ffenses for which the maximum period of incarceration
is six months or less are presumptively 'petty."' (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
123 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(A) (2009); CAL. WF'I1. & INST. CODE § 6603(a) (West
2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917(1) (West 2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/40(a)
(2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.7(4) (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06(c) (2005);
MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 123A, § 14(a) (LexisNexis 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.492 (West
2006); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:11 (LexisNexis 2008); N.Y. MENTAL HYG LAW.
§ 10.07(a) (McKinney 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (2008); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(a) (West 2009); VA. CODE. ANN. § 37.2-908(B) (2009); VA.
CODE. ANN. § 37.2-908(C) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 2008);
Wis. STAT. § 980.06 (2008).
124 IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9 (permitting fewer than twelve jurors to render a verdict); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 6603(c) (2) (f) (West 2009) (requiring a unanimous verdict); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 69.071 (West 2004); 725 IlL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/25(d) (2008) (requiring
a unanimous verdict); IoWA CODE ANN. § 229A.7(5) (West 2000) (requiring a unanimous
verdict); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06(d) (2005) (requiring twelvejurors unless the parties
and court agree to fewer); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2005) (requiring a unanimous
verdict); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 123A, § 14(d) (LexisNexis 2003) (requiring a unanimous
verdict); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.495(1) (West 2006) (requiring a unanimous verdict); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:11(I) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring a unanimous verdict); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (2008) (requiring a unanimous verdict); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(b) (West 2009) (requiring a unanimous verdict); VA. CODE.
ANN. § 37.2-908(B) (2009) (requiring a unanimous verdict); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09.060(1) (West 2008) (requiring a unanimous verdict); Wis. STAT. § 980.05(2),
(2) (b) (2010) (requiring twelve jurors unless the parties agree otherwise); see also State v.
Denman, 626 N.W.2d 296, 297 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a unanimous verdict is
required but not that the defendant be made aware of that fact); Romley v. Superior
Court, 7 P.3d 970, 972 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that out of eight jurors, six must
concur to render a verdict).
125 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), (d) (2006).
126 MINN. STAT. § 253B.185(1) (2008); In re Civil Commitment of Thompson, No. 76-PR-06-
990, 2007 Minn. Ct. App. LEXIS 1190, at *1, *13 (Dec. 11, 2007) (holding that the Min-
nesota State Constitution does not mandate ajury trial in civil commitment proceedings).
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New York, in contrast, gives the defendant a right to a hybrid
jury/bench trial. The person has the right to have a jury make the
initial finding that he is a "detained sex offender who suffers from a
mental abnormality.""' If the jury so unanimously finds,' 2 then it is
the judge who must decide whether the person is a "dangerous sex
offender requiring confinement or a sex offender requiring strict and
* 1* 33intensive supervision.
Standard of proof is another area of variance. According to the
U.S. Supreme Court, the burden of proof that the state must meet is
"clear and convincing evidence," not the more stringent standard of
"beyond a reasonable doubt."l34 Despite the fact that states are not
required to demand this higher burden, nine states do: Arizona,'3 5
California," Illinois," Iowa," Kansas, Massachusetts, 4 0 South Caro-
lina,4' Texas,142 Washington, and Wisconsin.144 In contrast, ten
states and the federal government set the burden of proof at clear
and convincing evidence."
In addition, because the commitments are civil and not criminal,
respondents do not have a federal constitutional right to competen-
cy. Arizona,46 Iowa,"' Kansas,"" Massachusetts," Missouri,'-o South
127 In Nebraska, the district court reviews the findings of a mental health board. NElB. REV.
STAT. § 71-1208 (2008).
128 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.31 (West 2009).
129 State v. Anderson, 730 N.W.2d 570, 571 (N.D. 2007).
130 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.4(e) (2) (West 2007).
131 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(d) (McKinney 2011).
132 IJd.
133 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(f) (McKinney 2011).
134 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).
135 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(A) (2009).
136 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (West 2009).
137 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/35(d) (2) (West 2008).
138 IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.7(5) (West 2008).
139 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2008).
140 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 123A, § 14(d) (LexisNexis 2003).
141 S.C. CODi.. ANN. § 4448-100(A) (2008).
142 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(a) (West 2008).
143 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 2008).
144 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(3) (a) (West 2008).
145 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006); FIA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917(1) (West 2009); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 632.495 (West 2011); Nm. REV. STAT. § 71-1209(1) (2008); N.H. Ri~v. STAT. ANN. § 135-
E:11(1) (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.32(a) (West 2009); N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. § 10.07(d) (McKinney 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2007): 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. §9795.4(e)(3) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-908(C) (2009); In re Linehan, 557
N.W.2d 171, 179 (Minn. 1996), vacated Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997).
146 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(D) (2009).
147 IOWA CODE § 229A.7(1) (West 2009).
148 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(g) (2008).
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Carolina,'"' Texas, 52 Virginia,'"5 Washington,' 4 and Wisconsin'"5 have
all held that individuals do not have the right to be competent at
their sexually violent predator trial. In August 2010, the California
Supreme Court ruled that due process does not require that a person
be mentally competent when undergoing a commitment or recom-
mitment trial as a sexually violent predator." New Hampshire allows
a limited right to competency.
Nor do those accused of being a sexually violent predator enjoy
the right against self-incrimination.1" Some states like Arizona,15 Cal-
ifornia," and Missouri"' allow the prosecution to call the individual
to the stand against his will. Other states like Kansas,162 New Jersey,13
Pennsylvania,'64 and Texas" allow the person to be compelled to un-
dergo a state psychological or psychiatric exam. Florida, '" Massachu-
149 Commonwealth v. Nieves, 846 N.E.2d 379, 385-86 (Mass. 2006).
150 State ex rel. Nixon v. Kinder, 129 S.W.3d 5, 8-11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
151 SeeS.C. Coio ANN. § 44-48-100(B) (2008). If a person is deemed incompetent, thejudge
will hold a hearing in which they will decide if the state can prove the person's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. If so, civil commitment can proceed. Id.
152 In reCommitment ofFisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 653-54 (Tex. 2005).
153 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-905 (2005).
154 WASH. REV. COi)E. ANN. § 71.09.060(2) (West 2008). Washington has a similar procedure
to South Carolina. See sufnra note 151 and accompanying text.
155 State v. Luttrell (In re Commitment of Luttrell), 754 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Wis. Ct. App.
2008).
156 Moore v. Super. Ct., 237 P.3d 530, 544 (Cal. 2010).
157 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:5(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2008). If a person is charged with
a sexually violent offense but deemed incompetent for trial, he is held for ninety days. Id.
If he remains incompetent to stand trial, a judge will determine whether he committed
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If so, commitment may proceed. Id.
158 Allen v. Illinois held that the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply in sexually
dangerous person proceedings because they were "essentially civil in nature." 478 U.S.
364, 367, 375 (1986). The goal of the statute was "treatment, not punishment." Id.
159 See State ex rel. Romley v. Sheldon, 7 P.3d 118, 120-21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
a person charged with a sexually violent offense "may not assert the privilege against self-
incrimination as a reason to refuse to attend a deposition").
160 See People v. Leonard, 78 Cal. App. 4th 776, 792 (2000) (holding that the constitutional
right to remain silent did not apply to persons charged with sexually violent offenses).
161 Bernat v. State, 194 S.W.3d 863, 870 (Mo. 2006) (holding that the state has a "compelling
interest in ensuring that the jury orjudge makes a reliable determination of whether the
person sought to be committed is an SVP," while other persons, in contrast, subject to civ-
il commitment in Missouri do have the right against self-incrimination).
162 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08(c) (2006).
163 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.28(b) (West 2009).
164 Commonwealth v. Howe, 842 A.2d 436, 445 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
165 TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.061 (f) (West 2008).
166 FIA. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a) (1) (A).
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setts," and New Hampshire'6" allow individuals to refuse a state exam;
however, the price of refusal is that their own experts can be prohi-
bited from testifying. In New York, upon request, the court will in-
struct the jurors if the individual refused to be examined by a state
psychologist.' Illinois," lowa,'7' Virginia,'72 and Wisconsin'" stand
out in giving accused sexually violent predators the right to remain
silent.
Despite these differences, there are two important similarities
among sexually violent predator states that serve to limit the number
of people who can be committed. First, all states except New York 74
and North Dakota175 require that the person have been convicted of
at least one sexually violent offense or have been charged with a sex-
ually violent offense but found incompetent or not guilty by reason of
insanity, mental disease, or mental defect.76  In addition, the states
167 Commonwealth v. Connors, 447 Mass. 313, 319 (2006) (holding that the defendant could
not selectively invoke the privilege to refuse to speak with qualified psychiatric examin-
ers).
168 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:9(IV) (Lexis Nexis 2008).
169 N.Y. MENTAL HYo. § 10.07(d) (McKinney 2011).
170 725 Il.l COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/25(c)(2) (West 2008).
171 IOWA CODE § 229A.7(1) (2008).
172 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-901 (2005).
173 State v. Harrell (In re Commitment of Harrell), 747 N.W.2d 770, 778 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
174 The New York statute states:
The respondent's commission of a sex offense shall be deemed established and
shall not be relitigated at the trial, whenever it is shown that: (i) the respondent
stands convicted of such offense; or (ii) the respondent previously has been fotind
not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect for the commission of such
offense or for an act or acts constituting such offense. Whenever the petition al-
leges the respondent's commission of a designated felony prior to the effective
date of this article, the issue of whether such offense was sexually motivated shall
be determined by thejury.
N.Y. MENTAL HyG. § 10.07(c) (McKinney 2011) (emphasis added); see aLso State v. Andre
L., 924 N.Y.S.2d 467, 469 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (affirming the trial court's finding that an
offender's first degree robbery conviction was sexually motivated and dangerous enough
to require confinement because he suffered from a mental abnormality based on evi-
dence "[he] left his home dressed in women's undergarments with the intention of ex-
posing himself, and the robbery was an additional element that was part of the thrill in-
volving sexual arousal").
175 North Dakota does not explicitly require a charge or conviction but instead requires that
the sexually violent person is "an individual who is shown to have engaged in sexually
predatory conduct." N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01 (2008).
176 ARiz. Rtv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3702 (2009); CAL. WEL. & INST. CoDE § 6600(a) (1) (West
Supp. 2009); FiA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10) (a) (West Supp. 2009); 725 lu.. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 207/15(3)(b) (1) (West Supp. 2008) (Illinois also allows a finding of delinquency
for a sexually violent offense); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(11), 229A.7 (West Supp. 2009)
(in Iowa, before a person who was found incompetent or not guilty by reason of insanity
can be committed as a sexually violent predator, the court must first find beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that he committed the underlying sexually violent offense); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a07(g) (2008) (in Kansas, before a person who was found incompetent can
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and federal government closely follow the Supreme Court language
in Hendricks and Crane,"' in that they require the person to have a
current mental disorder or abnormality that causes him to have se-
rious difficulty controlling himself such that he poses the risk of
committing future acts of sexual violence."
3. Discussion
As this Part has shown, most states offer more than the minimum
constitutional protections required by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
majority of states (fifteen of twenty) offer accused sexually violent
predators more procedural protections than required by the Su-
preme Court. Indeed, of the twelve states that passed sexually violent
predator laws after Hendricks, nine give accused SVPs the right to a
jury trial, and of these, four set the standard of proof at beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
These results may seem surprising in light of the fact that sex
crimes evoke such serious passions, and politicians are eager to show
be committed as a sexually violent predator, the court must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that he committed the underlying sexually violent offense); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
123A § I (LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. §253B.02(18c)(a)(1) (2009) (Minnesota re-
quires that the person have "engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct"); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01(1) (2008); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 135-E:2(XII) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26(b) (West
2008); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9792 (West 2007); S.C. ConE ANN. § 44-48-30(1)(a)
(Supp. 2008); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE ANN. § 841.003 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN.
§37.2-900 (2009); WASH. REV, CODE §71.09.020(18) (2010); Wis. STAT. §980.01(7)
(2011).
177 534 U.S. 407 (2002). In Crane, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified what the state had to
prove in terms of a sexually violent predator's ability to control himself. Id. at 413. "[W]e
recognize that in cases where lack of control is at issue, 'inability to control behavior' will
not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to say that there must be
proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior." Id.
178 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (a) (1) (West Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.912(10)(b) (West Supp. 2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/15(3) (C) (5) (West
Supp. 2008) (note Illinois' formulation: "The person is dangerous to others because the
person's mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he or she will engage in
acts of sexual violence"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2 (West Supp. 2009); MASS. ANN. LAWs
ch. 123A § I (LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. § 253B.02(18c) (2009); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 632.480(5) (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 135-E:2(XII) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2008); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(f) (McKinney 2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9792 (West
2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4448-30 (Supp. 2008); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 841.003 (West 2009) (Texas uses the language "suffers from a behavioral abnormality
that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence"); VA. CODE
ANN. § 37.2-900 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE 71.09.020(18) (2010); Wis. STAT. § 980.01(7)
(2009 Supp. 2011); 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (5),(6) (LexisNexis 2008); State v. Ehrlich (In re
Leon G.), 59 P.3d 779, 787 (Ariz. 2002).
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that they are tough on criminals."'9 Yet as the next Part will discuss,
affording extra procedural protections to accused sexually violent
predators makes sense from a constitutional and public policy pers-
pective.
V. DOES THE ADAM WALSH ACT VIOLATE PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS?
In United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court upheld the Adam
Walsh Act on narrow constitutional grounds. Although Comstock et
al. argued at the lower court level that the Act violated their rights to
procedural and substantive due process as well as equal protection
under the law, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not
consider these arguments but instead upheld the dismissal on
grounds that the law exceeded Congress's powers under Article 1,
Section 8 of the Constitution.'8 o In its decision, the Supreme Court
held only that Congress had not exceeded its power under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause. It specifically left open the other constitu-
tional claims. 8 1
In determining whether federal inmates may even raise a proce-
dural due process violation, they must first establish that a constitu-
tionally protected interest is at stake. The Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution protects persons against deprivations of life, li-
berty, or property. In this instance, inmates face lifetime incarcera-
tion in a locked mental hospital, and the Court has held that there is
a liberty interest in avoiding involuntary psychiatric treatment and
transfer to a mental institution.
A. The Significance of State Protections
In determining whether the Adam Walsh Act violates inmates'
procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, it makes sense to begin by comparing the fed-
179 See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS (1997) (arguing that the root of tough anti-crime policies in the
United States was political and not, as is popularly believed, due to an increase in the in-
cidence of crime); see also BARRY GIASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE
AFRAID OF THE WRONG THINGS 148-50 (1999) (noting that in his reelection campaign,
President Clinton signed a bill "demonstrating his opposition both to drug abuse and ac-
quaintance rape").
180 United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1949.
181 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010).
182 Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980).
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eral law with state protections. In questions of substantive due
process, the Court often looks both historically and contempora-
neously across states. For instance, the Court looked to state legisla-
tion in deciding that there was a national consensus against execu-
tion for rape of an adult woman, 3 rape of a child,8 4 execution of the
insane,"' execution of fifteen,"" sixteen, and seventeen year old juve-
niles,"" and execution of the "mentally retarded.""" Similarly, in Law-
rence v. Texas, the Court looked to evolving standards of private, con-
sensual sexual conduct as evidenced by laws across the country to
strike down the anti-sodomy law previously upheld in Bowers v. Hard-
wick as a violation of a constitutionally protected liberty. 8 9
Just as there are evolving standards in the substantive due process
context, so are there evolving standards in the procedural context.
In Medina v. California, Justice O'Connor cited Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Griffin v. Illinois for the proposition that
[t]he concept of due process is, "perhaps, the least frozen concept of our
law-the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful
social standards of a progressive society. But neither the unfolding con-
tent of 'due process' nor the particularized safeguards of the Bill of
Rights disregard procedural ways that reflect a national historic policy."'90
If the Court looks at state practices across the country, it will see
that almost all relevant states grant more procedural rights to SVPs
than the federal government grants them under the Adam Walsh Act.
Indeed, out of all twenty SVP states, only North Dakota allows a per-
son to be committed as an SVP who has never been convicted of, or
charged with, a sex crime. Such a consensus certainly reflects the
kind of national historic policy that the Court should not ignore.
Furthermore, paying attention to what the states are doing in the
SVP context avoids the sorts of federalism concerns that exist in the
Eighth Amendment context. '9 In striking down the Adam Walsh Act,
183 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
184 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421, 469 (2008).
185 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408-10 (1986).
186 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826-29, 838 (1988).
187 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005).
188 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
189 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986).
190 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (O'Connor,J., concurring) (citing Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956)).
191 See Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling oJ Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as
Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1089, 1133 (2006) ("[B]y incor-
porating the counting and characterizing of state legislation into Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence, the Supreme Court has lumbered that jurisprudence with all of the prob-
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the Court would actually be deferring to the states instead of sup-
planting them. As the Court states in Medina v. California, " [B]ecause
the States have considerable expertise in matters of criminal proce-
dure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of common-
law tradition, it is appropriate to exercise substantial deference to leg-
islative judgments in this area."' 2  Of course, as the Court held in
Hendricks, SVP commitments are not actually classified as criminal. 3
But still, in deciding whether to uphold outlier legislation like the
Adam Walsh Act, the Court should pay attention to the consensus
that exists across SVP states regarding procedural protections af-
forded to SVPs.
B. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld'94 and Wilkinson v. Austin,15 the Court used
the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge'% to assess whether the
state had afforded sufficient procedural due process under the Con-
stitution to protect a defendant's liberty. These decisions are signifi-
cant because they clearly show that the balancing test has replaced
the more nebulous standards of due process that were used previous-
ly.M" Thus, this Article will apply the Eldridge balancing test in deter-
mining whether the Adam Walsh Act violates procedural due process.
Eldridge dictates that in determining the requirements of due
process in a particular circumstance, three factors must be consi-
dered:
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; . . . the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the ad-
ditional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.'
Without question, the private interest at stake is significant. The
Adam Walsh Act allows the federal government to deprive people of
lems associated with the 'indeterminacy of levels of generality' that plague other areas of
constitutional law.").
192 Medina, 505 U.S. at 445-46.
193 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
194 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004).
195 545 U.S. 209, 224-25 (2005).
196 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
197 See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976) ("The touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government." (citations omitted)
(quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974))).
198 Eldfidge, 424 U.S. at 335.
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their freedom indefinitely. Indeed, history has shown that once a
person is committed as a sexually violent predator, it's unlikely that
he will ever be released.99 In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Court con-
firmed the significance of incarceration: "Freedom from bodily re-
straint has always been at the core of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action."200
Next, the courts must assess the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of liberty due to the procedures used, and the probable value of addi-
tional safeguards. As discussed above, sex offenders have a very low
rate of recidivism.' Just 5.3% of sex offenders were rearrested for a
new sex crime within three years of release from prison.202 In addi-
tion, because accused SVPs are older, they are likely to be at even
lower risk of reoffending.10 Thus, even with ordinary due process
protections in place, a significant danger exists that the government
will lock someone away who would not reoffend if released. Eliminat-
ing the requirement that a person have actually been convicted of, or
at least charged with, a sex crime only increases the risk of false posi-
tives.
Last, courts need to consider the governmental interest at stake
and the burdens of additional protections. Without a doubt, the gov-
ernment has an important interest in protecting the safety of men,
women, and children against predatory sex offenders. Yet the weight
of that interest is directly related to the risk posed: the greater the
danger, the greater the governmental interest. Not only are sex of-
fenders unlikely to recidivate, but the overall incidence of sex crimes
has been dropping for the past two decades.
According to the Uniform Crime Reports,204 the number of forci-
ble rapes known to the police reached its peak in 1992.2'5 From 1993
199 See supra Table 2.
200 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
316 (1982)).
201 See supra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
202 DOJ, supra note 21, at 24.
203 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
204 The FBI began compiling the Uniform Crime Reports in 1930 from law enforcement
agencies across the country. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 708, 710 (1963). Although participation has increased dramati-
cally since 1930, it is purely voluntary, and as a result some agencies do not provide data.
Uniform Crime Reports: A Word About UCR Data, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/word (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
205 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITEI) STATES
2009, at tbl.1 (2010), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_01.html
(showing the number of forcible rapes between 1990 and 2009 and showing that there
were 109,062 forcible rapes in 1992).
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through 2010, the number of forcible rapes known to police has con-
206tinued to decrease with few exceptions. The rate of forcible rapes
per 100,000 persons in the U.S. has also consistently dropped, from a
high of 42.8 in 1992 to 28.7 in 2009.207
In addition, the number of substantiated cases of child sexual
abuse has been steadily decreasing during this same time period.20
The National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System ("NCANDS") ag-
gregates and publishes statistics from child protection agencies across
the country, including all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico.20' It has been collecting, analyzing, and publishing a re-
port on this data for the past 20 years. 210 Researchers analyzed the
NCANDS data and found that sexual abuse of children has dropped
58% from 1992 to 2008."
Considering all three parts of the Eldridge test-the significant li-
berty interests at stake, the elevated risk that a person may be com-
mitted erroneously due to the procedures used, and the important
governmental interest-it seems clear that the expansive commit-
ment criteria in the Adam Walsh Act violate the due process rights of
accused sexually violent predators. Consequently, states should not
follow in the federal government's footsteps.
If the Court allows the government to commit individuals as sex-
ually violent predators who have never been charged with a sex
crime, the Court-whether intentionally or not-creates an incentive
for the government to circumvent Sixth Amendment protections.
Currently, in eighteen of the twenty SVP states, the only way that a
person can be committed as an SVP is if he is either convicted, or
found not guilty by reason of insanity, of a qualifying sex offense.
Additionally, in these states, a person may be committed as an SVP if
206 I; see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PRELIMINARY ANNUAL,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, JANUARY-DECEMBER 2010, at tbl.3, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/preliminary-annual-ucr-jan-
dec-2010/data-tables/table-3 (showing the number of forcible rapes in 2010); U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at tbl.310, available
at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0310.pdf (showing that
the forcible rape rate, per 100,000 population, was 36.8 in 1980, 41.1 in 1990, 37.1 in
1995, 32.0 in 2000, 33.1 in 2002, 32.3 in 2004, 31.8 in 2005, 31.0 in 2006, and 30.0 in
2007).
207 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 205.
208 David Finkelhor & Lisa M. Jones, Explanations for the Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Cases,
JUV.JUST. BUiL.L. (Office of Juvenile justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, Washington, D.C.),Jan. 2004, at 1.
209 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH ANI) HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009, at ii (2010).
210 Id.
211 DAVID FINKELHOR, LISA JONF.S & ANNE SHATTUCK, UNIV. OF N.H. CRIMES AGAINST
CHILDREN RESEARCH CENTER, UPDATED TRENDS IN CHILD MAI.TREATMENT, 2008, at 1-2.
Dec. 2011] 421
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ajudge finds that he committed a qualifying sex offense for which he
was charged but was later deemed incompetent to stand trial. The
Adam Walsh Act affords none of these procedural protections. The
Act empowers the federal government to avoid the time and mone-
tary cost of trial as well as the risk of a defendant being found not
guilty. For a prosecutor intent on locking someone up forever as an
SVP, it is far cheaper and easier to go through civil commitment pro-
ceedings than the criminal process. The Supreme Court should not
uphold rules that create incentives for undermining constitutional
rights.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
Even if the Supreme Court holds that the Adam Walsh Act does
not violate procedural due process, states must still decide whether
they should lower the threshold for commitment under the sexually
violent predator laws. After all, the Supreme Court merely sets the
floor for constitutional protections; states may always guarantee
more. This Part argues that enhanced procedural protection makes
sense from a public policy perspective.
Implementing the sexually violent predator laws as currently writ-
ten demands enormous resources, and changing the laws to increase
commitments would only end up costing the state more. When there
were just sixteen SVP states, funding was estimated to be somewhere
in the range of $225 million to $321 million per year.22 As the num-
ber of commitments increases, so will the costs. In the budget year
2005-2006, California allocated $64 million to cover all SVP related
costs. This was a cost of $150,000 per committed SVP, and this did
not include courtroom or attorney costs.2 13 This figure is pretty stan-
212 ERIC S.JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA'S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF
THE PREVENTIVE STATE 62 (2006) (citing WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY,
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: COMPARING STATE LAWS I
(2005); TERRENCE W. CAMPBELL, ASSESSING SEx OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PITrFAILS 6
(2004)).
213 DEIDRE M. D'ORAZIO, STEVEN ARKOWITZ, JAY Ai)AMS & WESLEY MARAM, THE CALIFORNIA
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTE: HISTORY, DESCRIPTION & AREAS FOR
IMPROVEMENT (2009), available at http://ccoso.org/papers/CCOSO%20SVP%20Paper.
pdf. For the first eight years after California's SVP law was passed, SVPs were housed at
Atascadero State Hospital. Id. at 19. In 2005, the state completed Coalinga State Hospit-
al, which was specifically built to house SVPs. Id. As of September 2011, Coalinga housed
more than nine hundred sex offenders. Ryan Gabrielson, Sex Offenders at State Hospital
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dard.2 4 Legal fees add significantly more. Not only are there attor-
ney fees, but there are also expert fees and the costs of trial and ap-
peal. In Washington State, the legal fees per offender added up to
215$60,000 per year.
In order to pay these costs, some states have taken measures like
reducing the number of probation officers and cutting funds to do-
216
mestic violence and sexual violence prevention programs. Others
have cut funding to sex offender treatment programs that have been
shown to reduce recidivism by as much as 30% to 40%.I In addition,
these laws force states to divert funds from addressing the lion's share
of sex crimes, which are perpetrated by family and friends.
In a world of limited resources, states spend hundreds of millions
of dollars locking up individuals for crimes that they might commit
instead of spending money solving crimes that have already hap-
pened. This irony is especially poignant with regards to the thou-
sands of rape kits that languish in police departments across the
country. According to a 2009 Human Rights Watch report, in Los
Angeles alone at the time, there were at least 12,669 untested sexual
assault kits (known as rape kits). 2 8 In order to test these kits, Los An-
geles would need to hire additional staff in their DNA laboratory at a
cost of approximately $1.6 million a year.2" Although the Los An-
geles Police Department has made some progress in reducing the
number of unanalyzed kits, the California budget crisis has led to
220
mandatory work furloughs that have slowed down these efforts.
214 See ROXANNE LIEB & ScoTr MATSON, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, SEXUAL
PREDATOR COMMITMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1998 UPI)ATE, at 11 (1998) (stating
that some of the estimated combined annual housing and treatment costs per individual
were $97,000 for Florida, $80,000 for Kansas, $110,000 for Minnesota, $85,000 for New
Jersey, $100,000 for North Dakota, $70,000 for Washington, and $82,125 for Wisconsin).
215 Id.
216 SeeJANUS, supra note 212, at 115. Janus writes that in 2004, California "spent more than
$78 million to lock up 535 predators, while providing no substantial sex offender treat-
ment for the seventeen thousand sex offenders in its prisons." Id. Janus also writes that
in 2004 Minnesota spent $26 million to lock up 235 predators. Id. That same year, pecu-
niary problems forced the state to propose cutting 137 of its 778 police officers and to ac-
tually eliminate one hundred probation officers' positions despite rising caseloads, and it
cut its funding for domestic violence and sexual violence prevention programs by $3.6
million per year. Id.
217 Id. at 115, 126 (describing lack of funding for sex offender treatment programs in Cali-
fornia and Massachusetts).
218 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TESTING JUSTICE: THE RAPE KIT BACKLOG IN LOS ANGELES CIT
AND COUNTY 1 (2009).
219 Id. at 32-33.
220 Joel Rubin, LAPD Cuts Backlog of Untested DNA Cases in Half L.A. Now BLOG (Oct. 5, 2009,
1:44 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/ 10/lapd-cuts-backlog-of-
untested-dna-cases-in-half-.h tml.
423Dec. 2011]1
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Consequently, thousands of rapists are walking the streets, potentially
stalking new victims.
CONCLUSION
In twenty states across the country and in federal prisons, individ-
uals are being kept in custody past their scheduled release date be-
cause they have been adjudicated to be sexually violent predators.
Deeming these laws civil instead of criminal significantly reduces the
constitutionally required procedural protections. Although accused
sexually violent predators are facing lifetime incarceration, they do
not have the right to competency, the right to a jury trial, the right
against self-incrimination, or the right to have their status proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Adam Walsh Act reduces these protections still further by al-
lowing a person to be committed indefinitely as a sexually violent
predator who has never been convicted of, or even charged with, a
sex offense. Although the Supreme Court upheld the Adam Walsh
Act in United States v. Comstock, it did so on limited grounds. Indeed,
the Court specifically noted that other grounds for challenging the
law-such as whether it violates due process-have not been adjudi-
cated.
In light of this, the Court can expect another challenge to the
Adam Walsh Act in the not-so-distant future. This Article has argued
that the Adam Walsh Act violates procedural due process and should
not be upheld. Should the Court decide that it does not violate due
process to commit people indefinitely with such a low threshold of
proof, this Article has argued that states should not follow suit. It
simply does not make sense from a public policy perspective due to
the likely error rate and the expense.
If states want to protect men, women, and children from danger-
ous sex offenders, they should direct the money that might be spent
incarcerating persons unlikely to reoffend in ways that have been
proven successful at reducing sex crimes. And, at least as important-
ly, states should make sure that there are sufficient funds to solve sex
crimes that have already occurred. We live in a world of limited re-
sources, and it is critical that we allocate them using reason and not
fear.
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR COMMITMENT VS.
COMMITMENT OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE AND THE MENTALLY ILL
Sexually Violent Predator Criminally Insane Mentally Ill
Right to Jury No Yes No
Trial
Timing of After finding of guilt and after Varies by state. Some states have a Unrelated to
Hearing criminal sentence has been bifurcated trial in which jury must finding of guilt
completed first come to a finding of guilt
before they decide whether the
defendant was insane at the
commission of the crime.
Right to No Yes No
Competency
Right against No Ves No
Self-
Incrimination
Who Has Prosecutor Either side, but insanity is usually Prosecutor
Burden of an affirmative defense thus giving
Proof? defendant the burden of proof
Standard of Minimum standard is clear and The state may require that the Minimum
Proof convincing evidence. defendant prove his insanity standard is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt. and convincing
evidence
Relevant Defendant's current mental state Defendant's mental state at the Defendant's
Temporal time of the crime current mental
Moment state
Is Mental State No. District Attorney must prove Yes No. State must
Only Issue? that present mental disorder makes prove that person
it difficult for defendant to control is mentally ill and
himself such that he poses the risk dangerous.
of committing a new sexually
iolent offense.
uration of Indefinite Indefinite Indefinite
Commitment IV
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TABLE 2
SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES ACROSS THE COUNTRY BY DATE
OF PASSAGE-TYPE OF COMMITMENT, NUMBER OF PEOPLE
COMMITTED/RELEASED AND TOTAL BUDGET
State Year of Length/Type of Commitment # of People # of People Total Civil
Passage Committed as of Ever Commitment
Summer 2008 Released Budget
(Millions)
WA 1990 Indeterminate 213 Unknown $38.6
Placement in a secure facility
operated by the department of social
and health services for control, care
and treatment
KS 1994 Indeterminate 216 13 $10.9
Kept in a secure facility
MN 1994 Indeterminate 516 0 $54.9
Secure treatment facility unless
person proves by clear and
convincing evidence that a less
restrictive treatment facility is
consistent with his treatment needs
and safety of the public
WI 1994 Indeterminate 352 36 $34.7
"Committed to the custody of the
department for control, care and
treatment until such time as the
person is no longer a sexually violent
person
AZ 1995 Indeterminate 58 114 $11.3
Licensed facility by state hospital
CA 1995 Indeterminate 808 24 $147.3
Locked state run hospital
IL 1997 Indeterminate 224 (206 in house, 18 18 $25.8
on conditional
Order of commitment to a secure release)
facility or conditional release
ND 1997 Indeterminate 58 0 5.4
Least restrictive but appropriate
treatment facility possible
In Kansas v Hendicks 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly held that Kansas's sexually
violent predator law was constitutional.
FL 1998 Indeterminate 240 7 $23.3
Secure state-run facility
IA 1998 Indeterminate 75 14 $5.0
Confined to a state facility designed
to confine, but not necessarily treat,
SVP
THROWING AWAY THE KEY
TABLE 2 (CONT'D)
SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES ACROSS THE COUNTRY BY DATE
OF PASSAGE-TYPE OF COMMITMENT, NUMBER OF PEOPLE
COMMITTED/RELEASED AND TOTAL BUDGET
State Year of Length/Type of Commitment # of People # of People Total Civil
Passage Committed as of Ever Commitment
Summer 2008 Released Budget
(Millions)
NJ 1998 Indefinite 340 24 $21.9
Facility designed for custody, care,
and treatment
SC 1998 Indeterminate 94 Unknown $2.9
Committed to custody of Department
of Mental Health for control, care
and treatment
MA 1999 Indeterminate 105 4 $30.7
Committed to a treatment center
MO 1999 Indeterminate 110 0 $9.8
Committed to the custody of the
Director of the Department of
Mental Health for control, care and
treatment
TX 1999 Outpatient 99 (50 in prison Outpatient $0.9
awaiting release and
49 in half way houses
or jail for violation of
civil commitment)
VA 1999 Indeterminate 138 Unknown $8.1
Less restrictive alternatives to
involuntary secure inpatient
treatment are possible if they have
been investigated and deemed
suitable.
In Kanms v Crane534 U.S. 407 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that in order to be committed as
a sexually violent predator, there must be "proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior."
PA 2003 Lifetime registration with the police, 20 0 $1.8
verify their residence on a quarterly
basis and attend monthly counseling
sessions.
NE 2006 Indeterminate 10 0 $13.5
"State must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that..-neither
voluntary hospitalization nor other
treatment alternatives less restrictive
of the subject's liberty than inpatient
or outpatient treatment ordered by
the Board are available or would
suffice to prevent the harm."
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TABLE 3
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR COMMITMENT
HEARINGS (ORGANIZED BY YEAR OF SVP LEGISLATION)
Year State Right to Right to be Right Standard of Number on Fifth Amendment Right
Counsel Competent to Proof Jury Needed
at Trial Jury to Commit
Trial
1990 WA Yes No Yes Reasonable Unanimous Statute does not specify
doubt
1994 KS Yes No Yes Reasonable 12 of 12 No. Can be ordered to
doubt submit to psychiatric
evaluation by state
1994 MN Yes Statute does No Clear and N/A Not specified in statute
not specify convincing
1994 WI Yes No Yes Reasonable 12 out of 12 Yes
doubt
1995 AZ Yes No Yes Reasonable 6 of 8 Cannot assert privilege as
doubt reason to refuse to be
deposed by the state
1995 CA Yes No Yes Reasonable 12 of 12 No. Can be called to the
doubt stand by the prosecution
1997 IL Yes Statute does Yes Reasonable Unanimous Yes
not specify doubt
1997 ND Yes Statute does No Clear and N/A Statute does not specify
not specify convincing
Kansas v N/A Yes No No Clear and N/A No
Henduicks convincing
(1997)
1998 FL Yes Yes Clear and 6 of 6 No
convincing
1998 IA No Yes Reasonable 12, Yes
doubt Unanimous
1998 NJ Statute does No Clear and N/A Can be ordered to submit
not specify convincing to a psychiatric exam
1998 SC No Yes Reasonable Unanimous Statute does not specify
doubt
1999 MA No Yes Reasonable Unanimous If present evidence of





1999 MO No Yes Clear and Unanimous No
convincing
1999 TX No Yes Reasonable Unanimous Person may be ordered to
doubt submit to all expert
exams. If he does not, (1)
his failure to participate
may be used as evidence
against him at trial; (2) he
may be prohibited from
offering his own expert
testimony; and (3) he may
be subject to contempt
proceedings.
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TABLE 3 (CONT'D)
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR COMMITMENT
HEARINGS (ORGANIZED BY YEAR OF SVP LEGISLATION)















1999 VA Statute does Yes Clear and 7 of 7 Statute does not specify
not specify convincing
2003 PA Statute does No Clear and N/A Def. can be ordered to
not specify convincing undergo sexually violent
predator assessment
2006 NE Statute does No Clear and N/A Statute does not specify
not specify convincing
2006 NH Yes Limited Yes Clear and Unanimous "if the person refuses to
convincing submit to an examination by
the state's expert the court
shall prohibit the person's





2006 USA Yes Statute does No Clear and N/A Statute does not specify
not specify convincing
2007 NY Yes Statute does Yes Clear and Unanimous If respondent refuses
not specify convincing psychiatric exam, jurors shall
be instructed of such if
requested.
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